The Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals Requires No Restrictions (DRAFT) by Maunu, Ari
1The Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals Requires No Restrictions
Abstract
There is a certain argument against the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals (PInI), or the
thesis that whatever is true of a thing is true of anything identical with that thing. In this argument,
PInI is used together with the self-evident principle of the necessity of self-identity (”necessarily, a
thing is identical with itself”) to reach the conclusion a=b → □a=b, which is held to be paradoxical
and, thus, fatal to PInI (in its universal, unrestricted form). My purpose is to show that the argument
in question does not have this consequence. Further, I argue that PInI is a universally valid principle
which can be used to prove the necessity of identity (which in fact is how the argument in question
is usually employed).
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1. The Barcanian argument
There is an argument, deriving from Ruth Barcan (1947), that some, e.g. Dale Jacquette (2011),
take as a refutation of the (unrestricted) principle of the indiscernibility of identicals (PInI), or the
thesis ”whatever is true of a thing is true of anything identical with that thing”. The argument in
question – let us call it the Barcanian argument (BA) – is as follows (Jacquette 2011, p. 107):
1. a=b → ∀X(Xa ↔ Xb) PInI
2. a=b assumption
23. □a=a → □a=b 1 & 2 (for λx(Xx) = λx(□a=x))
4. □a=a necessity of self-identity
5. □a=b 3 & 4
6. a=b → □a=b 2 & 5, conclusion
According to Jacquette, the conclusion 6 refutes PInI (in its general, unrestricted form) because it
may be ”only logically contingently true that a=b” (Jacquette 2011, p. 108). The purpose of this
paper is to show that this argument does not have the mentioned consequence: it does not refute
PInI (in its universal, unrestricted form). Further, I intend to argue, in contradistinction to Jacquette
and some others, that PInI is a universally valid principle and an argument very much like BA may
rather be used as a demonstration of the necessity of identity.1
1 This is how the argument is standardly taken (especially in its Kripkean form), i.e., not as a
refutation (by reductio) of PInI but as a validation of the necessity of identity. See, for instance,
Maunu (forthcoming).
Much of the material in this paper is familiar from the literature. My motivation for writing
this paper is that even some renown philosophers seem to misconceive PInI (thus misleading
students by their writings). Furthermore, I have noticed (via personal communication) that some
philosophers find it hard to understand that the necessity of identity thesis has nothing to do with
rigid designation for it can be expressed by means of definite descriptions (see the end of Section 5
below).
32. PInI and substitutivity
According to the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals, or PInI for short,
(PInI) If the object a is the same as the object b, then whatever is true of a is true of b (and
whatever is a property of a is a property of b).
This is not to be confused with the principle of substitution, PS:
(PS) If in a true statement (or sentence) some expression e is replaced by (i.e., substituted
with) an expression co-referential with it (i.e., with an expression sharing the referent
with e), a true statement (sentence) results.
PS says something about the substitutivity of signs whereas PInI concerns objects (referents).
Nevertheless, several influential philosophers seem to have made this confusion (and many of them
have thereby expressed doubts about PInI, or, at least about the universal applicability of it). For
example, in Quine 1961 [1953] we find (p. 139, emphasis removed):
One of the fundamental principles governing identity is that of substitutivity – or, as it might
well be called, that of indiscernibility of identicals. It provides that, given a true statement of
identity, one of its two terms may be substituted for the other in any true statement and the
result will be true.
Writings by prominent philosophers in which the indicated confusion is made include the
following: Barcan 1947, Marcus 1961, Marcus 1986, Quine 1961 [1953] (just quoted), Quine 1976
4[1953], Quine 1960 (p. 167), Hintikka 1957, Geach 1963, Wiggins 1965, Dummett 1973 (p. 270),
Haack 1978 (pp. 183–84), Simons 1998, Taylor 1998 (pp. 45–46, 189f.), Morris 2006 (pp. 118,
129).2
2 For example, Morris 2006, p. 118: ”It is a basic law of identity that if a is the same thing as b,
whatever is true of a is true of b. That means that if we begin with a truth about an object, in which
the object is referred to by one name, we should still have a truth if we refer to the same object by a
different name.”
Taylor 1998, pp. 45–46: ”It is surely a reasonable principle that if a = b, then whatever
property a has, b must have too. This is Leibniz’s principle of the indiscernibility of identicals. But,
as soon as one states this seemingly unproblematic principle, there arise apparent counterexamples.
... [Russell’s example ‘George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverley’ ....]
Frege’s approach attempts to preserve the logical sanctity of Leibniz’ law .... Russell too seeks to
preserve the logical sanctity of Leibniz’ law ....” (Those who think, as Taylor apparently does, that
PInI is in need of some kind of ”saving”, must confuse PInI with PS.)
Simons 1998, pp. 678–79: ”[PInI] is uncontroversial, but needs careful formulation to
exclude non-extensional contexts. For example, in ‘John believes that x defeated Mark Antony’,
substituting the names ‘Octavian’ and ‘Augustus’ for x may yield different truth-values ...”.
5On the other hand, the mentioned confusion has often (and a long time ago) duly been noticed
and corrected in the literature, for example, in Smullyan 1948, Thomason & Stalnaker 1968,
Stalnaker 1977, Cartwright 1971, Kripke 1971, Kripke 1980 (p. 3), Plantinga 1974 (p. 15), Maunu
2002.3 It is pointed out in many of these writings that while it is obvious that PS does not hold for
intensional statements (which may be shown by arguments like BA), this is not true for PInI, or at
least cannot be taken as true without a separate argument. In view of this fact, it is surprising that
Jacquette (2011) takes it for granted that BA refutes PInI (in its general form), and seeks to find out
which restrictions are needed to save PInI. (And he seems to be talking about PInI and not PS,
because he states that if a=b then ”all of the properties of a are properties of b, and conversely”
(Jacquette 2011, p. 112).)4
3 For example, Plantinga 1974, p. 15: ”if x has P essentially, then the same claim must be made for
anything identical with x. If 9 is essentially composite, so is Paul’s favourite number, that number
being 9. This follows from the principle sometimes called ‘Leibniz’s Law’ or ‘The Indiscernibility
of Identicals’:
(3) For any property P and any objects x and y, if x is identical with y, then x has P if and
only if y has P.
Like Caesar’s wife Calpurnia, this principle is entirely above reproach. [Footnote:] Apparently
Leibniz himself did not clearly distinguish (3) from:
(3') Singular terms denoting the same object can replace each other in any context salva
veritate
a ‘principle’ that does not hold for such excellent examples of language as English.”
4 However, possibly Jacquette, despite his just-quoted statement, is confused, and is conflating PInI
and PS; and he may be talking about logical necessity, understood in such a manner that only PS is
relevant. But then his conclusion does not concern PInI but is only that co-referential terms cannot
6It seems clear that PInI is not in need of saving or restricting at all. In my view already the
following is a convincing proof of the general validity of PInI: If something is true (or is a property)
of an object, a, and we ask whether it is true (or a property) of something identical with a, we must
of course answer in the positive because anything identical with a is a itself – this does not depend
on whether this ”something identical with a” is called ‘b’ or ‘c’ or whatever. Whether we use rigid
designators (e.g. proper names) or nonrigid designators (e.g. definite descriptions) is
inconsequential: if the capital of Russia (theC, for short) is the same as the most populous city in
Europe (theP), then whatever is true of the city that is in fact theC (= Moscow) is true of the city
that is in fact theP (= Moscow).
3. A refutation of PInI by extensional properties?
As expected, one set of truths or properties Jacquette regards as refuting PInI are those involving
intensionality; for example, modality as in the very formulation of BA given above. I shall deal with
such truths shortly. Meanwhile, let us consider Jacquette’s claim that there are also entirely
extensional properties that disprove PInI by an argument parallel to BA. Well, that would be hugely
astonishing, if there were such properties (but, in reality, there are not and could not be: with respect
to extensional logic PInI is, in effect, tantamount to PS). As an alleged example of such a property,
Jacquette (2011, pp. 114–15) gives λx(a=x → b≠x).5 Jacquette is here seriously mistaken. The
(allegedly) PInI-refuting argument parallel with BA – call it BA' – with this property (instead of
always be interchanged salva veritate, which is hardly news.
5 This is Jacquette’s ”F5”.
7λx(□a=x) of BA), is as follows:
1. a=b → ∀X(Xa ↔ Xb) PInI
2. a=b assumption
3'. (a=a → b≠a) → (a=b → b≠b) 1 & 2 (for λx(Xx) = λx(a=x → b≠x))
4'. a=a → b≠a (?)
5'. a=b → b≠b 3' & 4'
6'. a=b → (a=b → b≠b) 2 & 5', conclusion
However, there is no reason at all to accept 4', in contradistinction to the uncontroversial 4 in BA.
Further, as Jacquette (2011, p. 107) sees it, in BA ”the game is over” for PInI already at the third
step, by which he means, I gather, that what we have in 3, viz. □a=a → □a=b, is inconsistent or
paradoxical (and, hence, fatal to PInI). Now, in BA' the third step is (a=a → b≠a) → (a=b → b≠b).
There is nothing suspicious about this – indeed, it is a logical truth! (If a=b, then the antecedent (of
the main implication) is false; if a≠b, then the consequent is true.) Accordingly, 3' is independent
from any application of PInI: were anything bad to follow from 3' (though, of course, it will not),
PInI would not be responsible for it.
In short, Jacquette’s following claim is entirely groundless (Jacquette 2011, p. 114):
Interestingly, it turns out that we do not actually need logical necessity in the formulation of a
similarly embarrassing application of [PInI]. We can do so also by defining the property [...]
λx(a=x → b≠x). Now, if we assume that a=b, and bring back ≠ for further collaboration, then
under [PInI], we derive by parity of inference with [BA] something that is fatal once again to
the logical consistency of [... PInI ...]: a=a → a≠b.
84. PInI and intensional properties
Let us turn then to properties that involve intensionality – properties that at least may seem to
threaten PInI. These include modal properties (as in BA) and epistemically intensional properties,
which Jacquette (2011, pp. 110–11), following Roderick Chisholm, calls ”converse intentional
properties”, e.g. ”having the property of being believed by d to have the property F”, or λx(Bd(Fx)),
as Jacquette (2011, p. 110) formalizes this. Concentrating on modal properties (other intensional
properties may be dealt with analogously), the mistake in arguments like BA (as alleged refutations
of PInI) has in fact many times pointed out and solved in the literature. (See the references in
section 2 above.) Because this solution seem to have gone unnoticed by Jacquette and others who
think that BA rebuts PInI, I think I should repeat it here.
The original general form of PInI is, ”for every x and y, if x=y, then whatever is true of x is
true of y, and conversely”, or ”all of the properties of x are properties of y, and conversely”, or,
preliminarily, ∀xy(x=y → ∀X(Xx ↔ Xy)). Specifying this to singular terms, we see that, rather than
being what is given in step 1 in BA (i.e., a=b → ∀X(Xa ↔ Xb)), the true singular term form of PInI
is,
1*. a=b → ∀X(λx(Xx)a ↔ λx(Xx)b).
(This is not denied by Jacquette: he holds throughout Jacquette 2011 that the paradox producing
property (or one of them) is λx(□a=x).)
Then, instead of 3 we have at most
3*. λx(□a=x)a → λx(□a=x)b.
9(At this point we may notice that the step 3 of BA, i.e., □a=a → □a=b, is obtainable from 1* and
a=b only if ‘a’ and ‘b’ are rigid, i.e., refer to the same object with respect to every possible world.
In that case the conclusion 6 of BA is unproblematic.) With
4*. λx(□a=x)a
(which is indisputable for a rigid ‘a’) we obtain
5*. λx(□a=x)b
and, finally,
6*. a=b → λx(□a=x)b.
Concisely:
1*. a=b → ∀X(λx(Xx)a ↔ λx(Xx)b)
2. a=b
3*. λx(□a=x)a → λx(□a=x)b
4*. λx(□a=x)a
5*. λx(□a=x)b
6*. a=b → λx(□a=x)b
Here, ‘b’ occurs outside the scope of the necessity operator (i.e., in an extensional or transparent or
10
de re position), and so 6* says only that if a=b, then it is true of b that it is necessarily identical with
a, which is entirely unproblematic even for a nonrigid ‘b’ (assuming that ‘a’ is rigid). For example,
if 12 = the number of apostles, then it is true of the number that is in fact the number of apostles (=
12) that it is necessarily identical with 12, i.e., λx(□t=x)n holds, where ‘t’ stands for 12 and ‘n’ is a
shorthand for ‘the number of apostles’.
If, on the other hand, ‘a’ is assumed to be nonrigid, then there is no reason to accept 4*: It is
not true, we are entitled to presume, that the number of apostles was necessarily the number that
was in fact the number of apostles (= 12), i.e., it is not the case that λx(□n=x)n. The simple mistake
in BA consists in the illegitimate importation of singular terms into modal context. In short, for
modal or in any other way intensional F, we cannot equate Fa and λx(Fx)a – for example, □a=b is
not generally equivalent with λx(□a=x)b.
The solution to the (alleged) problem posed by BA may be summed up as follows. First, if ‘a’
and ‘b’ are rigid designators, the conclusion 6 of BA is unproblematic. Secondly, the exact form of
PInI is 1*, not 1 of BA. Thirdly, for a modal λx(Gx) one cannot without further ado get from
λx(Gx)c to Gc, if ‘c’ is not rigid. Accordingly, with Xx = (□a=x), what we get from 1* and a=b is
3* – and this together with 4* yields 6*, which holds even for a nonrigid ‘b’, if ‘a’ is rigid.
Fourthly, if ‘a’ is not rigid, 4* does not hold, which blocks the route to 6*.
All in all, BA does not disprove PInI. Nor is any other refutation possible: because only one
object (called ‘a’ or ‘b’ or whatever) is in play in PInI, we cannot have any difference in what is
true of or what is a property of this one and only one object: what PInI really states is just that
whatever is true (or, a property) of an object, is true (or, respectively, a property) of it, which
everyone should accept as a self-evidently true principle.
5. The necessity of identity
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We have seen that BA cannot be used to discredit PInI. On the contrary, because PInI is universally
valid, the following non-question-begging6 BA-style argument can be devised for demonstrating the
necessity of identity, in a manner that is not dependent on the nature of the singular terms used:
1*. a=b → ∀X(λx(Xx)a ↔ λx(Xx)b) PInI
2. a=b assumption
3". λxy(□x=y)aa → λxy(□x=y)ab 1* & 2 (for λx(Xx) = λx(λy(□x=y)a))
4". λxy(□x=y)aa necessity of self-identity
5". λxy(□x=y)ab 3" & 4"
6". a=b → λxy(□x=y)ab 2 & 5", conclusion
In contrast to BA, this is a valid argument. The entirely unproblematic conclusion is that if a=b then
it is necessary that the former is the latter. It does not matter whether ‘a’ and ‘b’, as used in this
argument, are rigid designators (e.g. proper names) or nonrigid designators (e.g. definite
descriptions): if the capital of Russia (‘theC’) is the same as the most populous city in Europe
(‘theP’), then it is true of the city that is in fact theC and the city that is in fact theP that necessarily,
the former (= Moscow) is the latter (= Moscow), i.e., theC=theP → λxy(□x=y)(theC)(theP). The
identity involved in the true ”TheC is theP” is, like any identity, a necessary identity, even though
”TheC is theP” does not express a necessary truth. The necessity of identity is independent from
6 Jacquette may be seen as begging the question against the necessity of identity in his statements
such as ”the property is intuitively that of being logically necessarily identical to entity a, a property
which certainly a has but b does not have, when it is only logically contingently true that a = b”
(Jacquette 2011, p. 108).
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rigid designation, the necessary truth of some identity statements is not.7
6. Conclusion
BA cannot be used to refute PInI in its universal form – it does not force us to place any restrictions
on PInI in order to save it. Extensional properties most certainly cannot be utilized in any argument
such as BA. Intensional (including modal) properties may seem to hold more promise, but, we have
seen, they fail to show the untenability of PInI as well. PInI is a universally valid principle: If a=b,
then only one object is in play, and there cannot be any variation in the truths and properties of this
one and only object. Further, this principle can be used to demonstrate the necessity of identity.8
7 Cf. Kripke (1980, 3): ”If ‘a’ and ‘b’ are rigid designators, it follows that ‘a = b’, if true, is a
necessary truth. If ‘a’ and ‘b’ are not rigid designators, no such conclusion follows about the
statement ‘a = b’ (though the objects designated by ‘a’ and ‘b’ will be necessarily identical).” See
also Maunu (forthcoming).
8 I thank the anonymous referees of Synthese for useful suggestions that improved this paper.
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